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This book argues that Latin America and the Caribbean suffers from 
two interrelated problems: saving is low, and those meager savings are 
used inefficiently. The two problems are connected and reinforced by 
the financial system—the set of institutions through which resources are 
channeled from savers to investors in the economy.
Figure 11.1 traces these connections. To start with, low saving in Latin 
America means that only a small flow of funds becomes available to 
firms and individuals that need to invest. This limited supply of loanable 
funds, in turn, limits the growth of the financial industry, resulting in high 
unit costs to channel funds between lenders and borrowers (the pro-
cess of financial intermediation). High costs compound other distortions 
in financial markets, such as the poor quality of credit information and 
weak protection of property rights. As a result, the available savings in 
the economy are misallocated: for example, the firms that receive credit 
from banks are not necessarily the most productive ones, or the ones 
with the greatest productive potential, but rather those that can pledge 
collateral. The inefficient use of resources in the economy, in turn, is a 
main determinant of the region’s low productivity (Pagés, 2010). Finally, 
low productivity is the other side of the coin of low returns to investment 
and saving (See Chapter 10). Not surprisingly, given the low returns to 
saving that prevail in the region, savings—and the financial intermedia-
tion of available savings—are also low.
The circle ends where it began: Latin America and the Caribbean 
is a region of low saving with undeveloped financial systems. Break-




financial intermediation. This chapter discusses two policy avenues 
that can help break the circle: (1) reducing financial market frictions 
to improve the efficiency of intermediation; and (2) encouraging more 
extensive use of formal financial saving instruments to reduce unit 
costs of operation.
Toward a Well-Oiled Financial Machine
In an ideal world with frictionless, competitive financial markets, resources 
flow toward the most productive investment projects, and the returns of 
these projects are reflected in the interest rate paid to savers. That is, ide-
ally, developed and competitive financial markets lead to high returns to 
capital and low interest rate spreads, which translate into high returns for 
savers. Instead, the low productivity of capital1 and the very high interest 
rate margins between what is charged to lenders and what depositors 
receive illustrate how far the region is from such an ideal world (see Fig-
ure 11.2).2 Financial systems across the region do not intermediate savings 
efficiently; on the contrary, these financial systems are small and frag-
mented between formal and informal institutions (see Chapter 3).
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Financial market distortions and low productivity are intertwined 
because financial frictions typically undermine the efficient allocation of 
savings. Misallocation of resources suppresses productivity in the region 
to about half its potential (Pagés, 2010). If productivity were higher, 
not only would accumulated savings be used more efficiently, but sav-
ings would accumulate more quickly in response to the higher returns 
prompted by the productivity boost.
At least two types of financial frictions are common in the region 
and reduce productivity growth. First, financial intermediaries lack good 
quality information about potential borrowers. With little information 
upon which to base their decisions, lenders are essentially flying blind; 
thus, they charge more to cover their risks and raise the margins of finan-
cial intermediation. As problems of asymmetric information can divert 
savings from their most productive uses, reforms that improve informa-
tion sharing should enhance resource allocation and efficiency. While the 
region has made good progress in this respect—especially in extending 
the coverage of credit bureaus—the quality and timeliness of the informa-
tion available through such bureaus is relatively low in some countries.3 
While credit information is abundant in some countries, it is scarce in 
others because the legal environment does not favor the storage and 





























Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank Global Financial Development Database.
Note: Interest rate spread is the interest rate charged by banks on loans to private sector customers 
minus the interest rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits. The 
terms and conditions attached to these rates differ by country, however, limiting their comparability. 
See endnote 3 of chapter 2 for the list of countries in each country group. 
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exchange of this valuable resource (see Frisancho, 2012). On average the 
regulatory framework (i.e., rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and 
quality of credit information available through public or private credit 
registries) is less conducive to information sharing in Latin America and 
the Caribbean than in other regions of the world (see Table 11.1).
A second constraint to financial market development and pro-
ductivity growth in the region relates to the cost of enforcing financial 
contracts. For financial relationships to thrive, the obligations of each 
party need to be explicit, and an impartial enforcing agent must be 
ready to act if needed. Unfortunately, the effective protection of prop-
erty rights in financial contracts in the region is weak. Column 2 in 
Table 11.1 illustrates how Latin America and the Caribbean lags behind 
Advanced Economies and other emerging market countries in the 
enforcement of legal rights. This raises the cost of financial intermedia-
tion in the region. It also feeds mistrust in the financial system because 
the weak protection of property rights affects both creditors and debt-
ors.4 If assets must be pledged as collateral to signal creditworthiness 
to deal with enforcement problems or information gaps, wealthy but 
unproductive entrepreneurs may gain access to finance, while poor but 
productive ones may remain excluded from or underserved by credit 
markets (see Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2011).
To address the underlying distortions, regulatory and institutional 
reforms are necessary. Several successful reforms have been launched 
in the region. Bankruptcy reforms in Brazil (2004–05), Colombia (2011), 
and more recently Chile (2014) appear to be reducing the costs of 
Table 11.1 Institutional Credit Market Indicators, Average 2014–2016
Region
Depth of credit information 
indexa (0–8)
Strength of legal rights indexb 
(0–12)
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.8 4.4
Advanced economies 6.7 6.1
Other emerging countries 6.4 5.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank (2016). 
a Depth of credit information index measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of 
credit information available through public or private credit registries. The index ranges from 0 to 8, 
with higher values indicating the availability of more credit information, from either a public registry 
or a private bureau, to facilitate lending decisions. 
b Strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws pro-
tect the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index ranges from 0 to 12, 
with higher scores indicating that these laws are better designed to expand access to credit.
See endnote 3 of chapter 2 for the list of countries in advanced economies and Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Other emerging economies includes countries from emerging Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
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enforcing financial contracts. At least in the case of Brazil, reforms have 
increased access to credit, especially for smaller firms (Araujo, Fer-
reira, and Funchal, 2012). Likewise, the recent introduction of collateral 
registries for movable assets in some countries aims to break the link 
between wealth and access to finance because they enable working 
capital and some forms of firm income to be pledged as collateral. In 
2006, Peru introduced a law governing guarantees for moveable col-
lateral, and Colombia introduced a similar law in 2013–14. Such policies 
have helped firms—especially smaller and younger ones—access bank 
financing under better terms (Love, Martínez Pería and Singh, 2013).
The high fixed costs that characterize financial markets create addi-
tional barriers to efficient financial intermediation. High fixed costs create 
natural incentives for industry concentration, which may lead to uncom-
petitive practices. While there is plenty of evidence of consolidation in 
the financial industry in Latin America over the past few decades, there 
is no compelling evidence that such consolidation or the subsequent 
increase in concentration has reduced competition (Gelos and Roldós 
2004; IDB, 2004; Levy Yeyati and Micco, 2007). If anything, standard 
measures of market power show that, at least in some countries, market 
power in loan and deposit markets has fallen over time (Williams, 2012). 
On the other hand, concentration in the banking industry does appear to 
impair cost-efficiency (Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro, 2011). Such inefficien-
cies can persist only if various factors prevent additional suppliers from 
entering the market. Chapter 3 discussed how the combination of high 
fixed costs and income inequality may limit the size of the financial sys-
tem in Latin America and the Caribbean because banks naturally locate 
only in areas where enough customers can afford service costs. One way 
to weaken the link between high fixed costs of operation and industry 
concentration is to expand the customer base. More customers would 
help reduce the unit costs of operations, making it more profitable for 
other financial institutions to enter the industry.
Broadening the Base
Savings in the region are channeled through a variety of formal and infor-
mal saving vehicles (see Chapter 3). Given this variety, traditional financial 
inclusion efforts have focused on access: opening bank accounts for the 
unbanked. This is a necessary first step, but is not enough to encourage 
formal (financial) saving.
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About 55 percent of the adult population still do not own accounts 
in formal financial institutions. Why not? According to the 2014 Global 
Findex Database (World Bank, 2014b), many people say such accounts 
are too expensive, require too much documentation to open, or are in a 
financial system they do not trust (see Figure 11.3).
Among people who already own an account, only 31 percent use it to 
deposit some of their savings, and only 26 percent use it to deposit all of 
their savings. Why don’t people save more through the financial system? 
Limited physical coverage of banking networks, lack of trust in banks, 
and high service fees are important constraints to save formally (see 
Chapter 9). These factors act as pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs that 
reduce the effective returns to formal saving. With limited returns, no 
wonder savers shy away from the formal financial system as a saving 
vehicle. How can these problems be resolved?
Reducing Service Costs
Financial institutions pass the high average (unit) costs of operating on 
to their customers, and thus reduce the effective returns that savers 
receive. In the financial services industry, the scale of operation matters: 
Figure 11.3  Reasons Why People Do Not Have a Formal Bank Account, by 
Region, 2014
Far away Too expensive Lack of documentation




























Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank (2014b).
Note: Bars show percentage of respondents who do not have an account at a financial institution and 
why. Percentages add up to more than 100 percent in some regions because some respondents gave 
more than one reason. See endnote 3 of chapter 2 for the list of countries in each country group. 
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if suppliers of financial services can spread fixed costs (for physical 
branches, reserves needed to meet regulatory capital requirements, and 
so on) over a greater volume of users, unit costs fall.5
Currently, only high-income households can afford the high unit ser-
vice costs of financial services in the region. Excluding a large bloc of 
potential customers reinforces the “smallness” problem, creating a vicious 
circle of small customer base, high unit costs, and financial exclusion.
Traditionally, governments around the world have sought to expand 
the user base of financial services by simply letting demand drive the 
growth of the financial system. More recently, however, governments—
particularly those in the developing world—have tried to incorporate 
potential users of financial services, by channeling large transactional mar-
kets, such as government transfers, through the formal financial system.
These strategies may have been successful at increasing owner-
ship of formal saving instruments. Ownership of a formal saving account 
increased to 45 percent of the region’s adult population in 2014 from 
34 percent in 2011—a 33 percent increase (World Bank’s Global Findex 
Database). Account ownership increased more in Latin America and the 
Caribbean than in any other region in the world (see Figure 11.4).

































Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank Findex Database.
Note: Account penetration is the percentage of respondents older than 15 years of age who had an 
account at a financial institution. See endnote 3 of chapter 2 for the list of countries in each country 
group. Data available only for 2011 for Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Gabon, Lesotho, Liberia and Swaziland and only for 2014 for Belize, Norway, Switzerland, 
Ethiopia and Namibia. 
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Efforts to expand the customer base can help reduce unit costs, 
which in turn may encourage more saving. Quasi-experimental evidence 
demonstrates a causal effect of financial access on saving behavior. For 
example, people who received their conditional cash transfers (CCTs) in 
Mexico as a deposit to their bank account increased their total savings 
by 60 percent, on average, compared to those who received transfers in 
cash (Ubfal, 2013). This increase in total savings—which included formal 
and informal instruments—was driven mainly by higher formal savings.
Despite considerable effort to increase financial inclusion, there is 
still room for improvement on several fronts. On the one hand, Latin 
America and the Caribbean still has the world’s lowest fraction of gov-
ernment transfers paid through formal financial instruments (Figure 11.5). 
Countries like Bolivia, El Salvador, and Jamaica still have a long way to 
go to meet even the regional average.
On the other hand, most beneficiaries of social programs in the 
region who are paid through bank accounts withdraw the money all 
at once, whether they need the money then or not. This percentage is 
higher than in other regions. To some extent, this practice may be due 
to design problems and misinformation. For example, in 2009, Colom-
bia’s CCT program, Familias en Acción, began paying beneficiaries 































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank (2014b).
Note: variable denotes the percentage of transfer recipients older than 15 years who received 
government transfers into an account at a financial institution or card in the past 12 months. See 
endnote 3 of chapter 2 for the list of countries in each country group.
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through basic saving accounts at a state-owned bank. According to data 
from the government agency in charge of promoting financial access, 
Banca de Oportunidades, over 90 percent of beneficiaries were receiv-
ing the transfers through an account at the state-owned bank by 2012. 
Yet, over 40 percent of beneficiaries in Bogotá, the main urban cen-
ter, thought their subsidy money was at risk if left in the bank account 
(when it really was not). Similarly, many beneficiaries did not know that 
the bank account used to deposit the CCT did not have a maintenance 
fee, and most of the recipients did not know that the accounts paid them 
interest (Maldonado and Tejerina, 2010). In Brazil, most beneficiaries of 
social programs receive transfers through a limited purpose instrument 
(electronic card), which as of 2012 required them to withdraw the funds 
within 60 days of receiving them.
These examples suggest that providing more information to recipi-
ents about how bank accounts work and paying attention to program 
design can help overcome the tendency to withdraw all the funds at 
once. This would help beneficiaries move a step closer to using the bank 
accounts for saving rather than for purely transactional purposes.
Keeping it Simple
Governments across the region have encouraged the financial industry 
to design and offer saving instruments with a varying mix of functions, 
costs, and requirements to make them more attractive. Simplified ver-
sions of the traditional saving account (sometimes called simplified 
accounts or basic accounts) are becoming increasingly popular. While 
the specific characteristics vary from one country to another, three 
features distinguish these instruments: they provide limited services, 
including ceilings on balances and transactions; financial institutions 
charge low (or no) fees and require low (or no) minimum balances; and 
they require less documentation than traditional accounts.
Many regulators in Latin America have embraced the effort to pop-
ularize saving products along these lines. Before implementing further 
policies to directly influence the features and price of saving products, 
policymakers should have a clear diagnosis of why innovation and cost 
reduction have not already taken place. If the problem is that these 
simplified products are not profitable to banks, for example, then man-
dating commercial banks to supply them would require public subsidies. 
Without the subsidies, commercial banks could try to compensate for 
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the losses by either making other financial products more expensive or 
by making it more difficult for potential clients to open the simplified 
accounts. Alternatively, if the problem is bad regulation or red tape, reg-
ulatory reforms would be needed.
The specific case in each country depends on country-specific cir-
cumstances. All in all, Latin America and the Caribbean still lags behind 
other regions in terms of the ease with which financial institutions can 
offer saving products, and potential customers face more requirements 
to open bank accounts. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Global Microscope, Latin America and the Caribbean as a region on 
average fares worse than East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa in these two 
areas, although a great deal of variation exists across countries.6
Mexico is at the forefront of efforts in the region to introduce sim-
plified accounts. In 2011, Mexico introduced a tiered system for the 
requirements and costs of opening and using bank accounts. Custom-
ers with relatively limited saving and transaction needs (in volume) need 
not go to the branch or provide any form of identification to open an 
account. Importantly, the system complies with anti-money launder-
ing principles. Within two years, the number of simplified accounts in 
commercial banks reached 12 million (Faz, 2013). Other countries in the 
region are following suit; for instance, in 2015 Costa Rica introduced a 
three-tiered system of accounts whose costs and requirements are pro-
portional to the balances and transactions permitted.
Despite their potential, simpler accounts per se may not be enough 
to encourage more financial saving. The obstacles that impede owner-
ship of formal saving instruments may be quite different from those that 
constrain their use as saving vehicles. Furthermore, in some cases, sim-
plified saving products may not be profitable; financial institutions will 
find it worthwhile to promote them only if they foresee users “graduat-
ing” to more complex financial products.
Fostering a Culture of Saving
Despite the increase in the number of bank accounts across the region 
in the past decade, the increase in the percentage of people who claim 
to save through formal financial institutions has been more modest. 
Saving through formal accounts rose to 16.4 percent of adults in 2014 
from 13.9 percent in 2011 (Figure 11.6), an 18 percent increase, accord-
ing to the World Bank’s FINDEx Database. Still, despite the increase, the 
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region lags behind Emerging Asia and Advanced Economies, and is only 
slightly better-off than Sub-Saharan Africa.
More can be done to encourage financial saving by leveraging the 
government’s efforts to expand financial inclusion. Given that lack of 
trust in banks is a problem in the region, the accounts used to deliver 
government transfers can be complemented with tools to build peo-
ple’s confidence in the system. As discussed in Chapter 9, lack of trust 
is sometimes linked to misinformation. For example, to the extent that 
mistrust reflects potential customers’ belief that balances can disappear 
if the money is not withdrawn, then tools that allow customers to con-
sult balances frequently and free of charge, such as debit cards or other 
electronic means, can help build user confidence over time.
Experimental evidence shows that people save more after they 
gain confidence in the system. Bachas, Gertler, Higgins and Seira (2015) 
study a sample of Oportunidades-Progresa beneficiaries who received 
a debit card along with their bank account in 2009–11. Beneficiaries 
could check their account balances as frequently as they wanted, free of 
charge. Over time, beneficiaries consulted their balances less and made 
fewer withdrawals. One year after receiving the “treatment” debit card, 
beneficiaries had reduced consumption and increased formal saving by 





























Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank (2014b).
Note: Measured as the percentage of respondents older than 15 years who saved at a financial 
institution in the past 12 months. 
See endnote 3 of chapter 2 for the list of countries in each country group, restricted here depending 
on data availability. Data available only for 2011 for Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Central African 
Republic, Comoros, Gabon, Lesotho, Liberia and Swaziland and only for 2014 for Belize, Norway, 
Switzerland, Ethiopia and Namibia. 
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similar amounts (meaning that they channeled all the new saving to for-
mal saving). With less cash in hand, the beneficiaries consumed fewer 
temptation goods (such as alcohol and tobacco), further reinforcing the 
increase in saving.
Delivering social transfers through term-saving instruments can help 
overcome behavioral and social saving constraints. For instance, policy-
makers in Colombia offered beneficiaries of conditional cash transfers 
the option to set aside a fraction of the transfer in a term deposit, which 
they could withdraw after a certain period of time. Households that 
were offered the fixed-term instrument saved more and invested more 
in health and education than those who received transfers through a 
standard deposit account (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2011).
Financial education is also important. Thanks to financial educa-
tion, combined with delivery of government transfers through bank 
accounts, beneficiaries of Familias en Accion in Colombia saved more 
(Núñez Méndez et al., 2012). Similarly, in 2009, Peru started paying gov-
ernment transfers through formal accounts at the state-owned Banco 
de la Nación. From the beginning, the strategy included a financial edu-
cation module that assured savers that balances left in the bank account 
were not at risk. The fraction of beneficiaries with low balances fell from 
close to 80 percent to less than 10 percent after one year (Trivelli, Mon-
tenegro, and Gutiérrez, 2011). A recent impact evaluation of the program 
(Boyd and Aldana, 2015) finds that financial education has a positive 
and sizable impact on the probability of saving, and on the probability 
of saving formally in a nearby bank. The program also helped to formal-
ize saving as beneficiaries gradually transferred their informal savings 
to the bank account provided by the conditional cash transfer program 
(Rosen, 2010).
International remittances channeled by migrant workers to their 
home countries represent another sizable transactional market that 
remains largely outside the formal financial system. Although every dol-
lar of remittances must, at some point, go through the financial system of 
the home country, this connection may be limited to the money transfer 
operator and the bank that carries out the currency conversion. Inter-
mediating remittances through the formal financial system can bolster 
economic efficiency and individual welfare through various channels. To 
begin with, the sheer size of remittance flows presents an opportunity to 
increase the volume of resources and transactions administered by local 
financial systems, thereby helping to lower unit service costs.7.
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Another important feature of remittances is that they are spaced 
out in intervals, and arrive in sizable sums (they are “lumpy”). This pat-
tern creates an inherent demand for savings. Researchers estimate that 
about 20 percent of remittances in developing countries are used for 
saving or investment. Furthermore, remittances are the point of entry for 
many remitters and their families to the formal financial system. Finan-
cial intermediaries can use remittances as a stepping stone to identify 
other sources of income for their new customers, which in turn can 
induce them to increase their lending to customers.
Innovative products and channels have considerable potential 
to turn remittances into financial saving. Commercial banks in El Sal-
vador have been particularly keen on reducing transaction costs and 
offering flexible ways to send and collect remittances. Experimental evi-
dence from El Salvador shows that giving remitters greater control over 
the accounts has the potential to increase savings by over 50 percent 
(Ashraf et al., 2015).
Greater control by migrants over savings accounts in their home 
countries can increase both the take-up rates and balances in savings 
accounts. In a randomized field experiment conducted by Ashraf et al., 
(2015), Salvadoran migrants in the Washington, DC area were assigned 
to different savings account options in El Salvador, or received no offer 
of any new financial product in the comparison group. Each option var-
ied the degree of control participants could exert on the new accounts 
that were offered at Salvadorian Banks.
The results provide evidence that migrants value and take advan-
tage of opportunities to exert control over savings in their home country. 
Migrants were much more likely to open savings accounts in El Salvador, 
and accumulate more savings at the new accounts, if they were assigned 
to the option offering the greatest degree of monitoring and control. 
The average savings in a 12-month period increased from US$186 in the 
comparison group to US$282 in accounts opened in the migrant’s own 
name. The evidence suggests that these numbers represented increases 
in total savings rather than shifts in saving mechanisms.
Banks in El Salvador have also devised various ways to extend mort-
gage loans to migrants in their home country. Some banks are even 
offering microcredit lines at preferential rates with no further require-
ment than the proof of remittances received.
Clearly, making more progress in terms of encouraging financial sav-
ing may require more than just opening bank accounts. It will require 
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complementary interventions focusing on financial education, building 
trust in financial institutions, and innovation in product design. The suc-
cess of these policies in terms of creating and sustaining a culture of 
formal savings will also depend on the functioning of the entire financial 
ecosystem.
Banking—The Old Fashioned Way
Technological and financial innovations like simplified accounts can 
make it easier to open bank accounts, but the availability of a bank 
branch, where potential customers can make regular deposits and with-
drawals, can also encourage saving. Bruhn and Love (2014) show that 
the almost overnight expansion of Banco Azteca to become the second 
largest network of branches in Mexico inspired a sudden boom in saving 
accounts in the municipalities in which Banco Azteca began operations. 
Similarly, expansion of the state-owned financial institution, Patronato 
del Ahorro Nacional, in 1993 increased households’ saving rate by over 
3 percentage points (from around 14 percent to 17 percent), with bigger 
surges among poorer households (Aportela, 1999).
The problem is that opening up physical branches, particularly in 
remote locations, can be very costly for financial institutions. Remote 
locations are by definition likely to bring in relatively few customers.
Over the years, policymakers have tried to create incentives for finan-
cial institutions to reach relatively small and distant communities. In Latin 
America, the deployment of physical infrastructure has relied heavily on 
the expansion of public banks. In Mexico, for instance, BANSEFI started 
a US$150 million program in 2002 to strengthen the efficiency and out-
reach capacity of 19 small savings and credit institutions. A core aspect of 
the program was the development of an information technology system 
linking 180 offices of these institutions and BANSEFI s´ own 551 branches 
(Taber, 2004). This allowed BANSEFI to increase its coverage from 28 per-
cent of municipalities in 2006 to 98 percent in 2013. In Chile, approximately 
21 percent of the branches of Banco Estado are in regions with fewer than 1 
million inhabitants. In Colombia, over 24 percent of the branches of Banco 
Agrario are located in cities with less than 1 million inhabitants.
India undertook one of the largest branch expansion programs in 
the world in the 1980s. To obtain a license to open a branch in a loca-
tion that already had one or more branches (a “banked location”), a 
bank had to open branches in four eligible “unbanked locations.” This 
BREAKING THE vICIOUS CIRCLE: FINANCIAL POLICIES FOR HIGH-QUALITY SAvING 277
process had a sizable positive impact on mobilizing saving and accumu-
lating capital (Burgess and Pande, 2005), although it is unclear whether 
these benefits outweighed the very significant costs of the decade-
long strategy.
Creating incentives for private institutions to open more branches 
can be even more challenging, and potentially expensive. High income 
inequality (as discussed in Chapter 3) and limited competition in the 
financial industry can reinforce this lack of incentives. Therefore, govern-
ments should have a clear diagnosis of the reasons for the low physical 
penetration and weigh all the policy options, including direct subsidies 
and changes to competition policy, where necessary.
More than Brick-and-Mortar Banking
A complementary approach to opening brick-and-mortar branches is 
promoting the use of alternative banking channels, such as agent net-
works. This form of branchless banking has the potential to promote 
financial saving by providing services at a lower cost, and with greater 
flexibility, than traditional banking to a broader customer base.
Bank agents are nonfinancial retailers that offer basic financial ser-
vices under the name of a financial services provider. They are access 
points to the formal financial system. Policymakers around the world 
are searching for new ways to offer saving instruments through branch-
less channels. In Kenya, for example, the Retirement Benefits Authority 
(RBA) introduced a retirement saving plan in 2009 for informal workers, 
who could contribute through mobile money providers. The plan suc-
ceeded in promoting formal saving (McKay and Pickens, 2010).
In Latin America, the popularity of bank agents has increased as reg-
ulatory frameworks have adapted, and as information technologies have 
allowed the massive use of portable devices (mobile phones, portable 
terminals) to carry out financial transactions. The region has the high-
est number of “pure” bank agents per 100,000 inhabitants (bank agents 
that directly link the customer with the financial institution without an 
e-money issuer or a telecom company mediating this relationship). Bra-
zil leads the expansion of agent networks, with 208 agents per 100,000 
inhabitants (see Table 11.2). The path for Brazil to become the regional 
leader was cleared in 1999 with a central bank resolution that instituted 
correspondente (correspondent) relationships, which allow banks to 
establish agreements with nonbanking firms to provide financial and 
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payment services. With the proliferation of agents in Brazil, the financial 
industry has been able to enter into increasingly more remote and less 
densely populated areas (Assunção, 2013).
In Chile, bank agents became popular even before appropriate reg-
ulation was put in place in 2010. A pilot program launched in 2005 by 
the state-owned Banco Estado was the precursor of the current Chilean 
model, which now has 118 agents per 100,000 inhabitants. Colombia 
introduced regulation for bank agents in 2006 and launched an ambi-
tious government subsidy program in 2007, under which banks would 
bid to place their agents in certain municipalities previously chosen by a 
government agency (Banca de Oportunidades). Households and small 
businesses were 13 percent and 8 percent more likely, respectively, to 
use formal savings products in municipalities covered by the program 
Table 11.2  Coverage of Bank Agents, Select Latin American Countries and 
Various Regions 
Agents per 100,000 
inhabitants











El Salvador 1.0 2.7
Bolivia 0.8 0.1
East Asia and Pacific 32.3 36.3
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 25.0 2.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 100.7 26.8
Middle East and North Africa 50.2 32.8
South Asia 57.6 221.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.2 3.0
Developed countries 18.8 3.7
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Cámara, Tuesta and Urbiola (2015) and the World Develop-
ment Indicators. 
Note: Developed countries include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States and Western Eu-
rope. Data for regions correspond to 2014; data for individual countries are for 2013.
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compared to peer individuals in a control group of municipalities (Econo-
metría and SEI, 2011).
Despite progress, important gaps remain and there is ample room 
for improvement. First, Latin America is very large, and while the region 
ranks first in terms of agents per 100,000 habitants, it has relatively few 
bank agents per 1,000 square kilometers compared to other developing 
regions. Thus, many geographical areas remain without coverage. Sec-
ond, the pervasive use of cash in the region makes transactions through 
bank agents expensive. Given the risks and costs of carrying cash over 
long distances, banks that operate networks need physical branches 
near the agent’s area of influence. This in turn suggests that most agent 
networks must be operated by banks with an already existing, large 
brick-and-mortar branch network.
To solve these problems, policymakers should encourage the entry 
of independent agent networks. They can reach more customers, par-
ticularly in remote areas, and also promote competition among financial 
institutions (de Olloqui, Andrade, and Herrera, 2015). Furthermore, 
expanding the range of services that agents can provide to include retail 
payments and remittances can also help financial institutions achieve a 
sustainable scale of operation.
Dialing up Technology
The widespread adoption of mobile technologies can also promote 
branchless banking.8 Financial accounts associated with a mobile phone 
number, or operated exclusively through mobile phones, are usually sim-
pler to set up and cheaper to use than standard bank accounts. Depending 
on the country’s specific regulations, mobile accounts typically do not 
require a minimum deposit or a minimum balance. They do not charge an 
administrative fee, and they do not charge users for a certain number of 
transactions per month (cash withdrawals, balance inquiries).
Mobile technology helps overcome one of the main obstacles cur-
rently facing bank agent networks in Latin America: the need to operate 
groups of agents through nearby branches. However, a parallel platform 
for financial services does have transaction costs associated with the 
high use of cash in the region. Potential customers that use cash for their 
everyday transactions have to convert that cash into electronic depos-
its and vice-versa (i.e., a process known as “cash-in-cash-out”, or CICO). 
Thus, for mobile technologies to effectively complement bank agents, 
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the costs of CICO have to decline. Doing so requires a combination of 
specialization in the provision of CICO services (for example, through 
specialized providers that can connect final users with multiple financial 
institutions) and encouraging less use of cash for daily transactions (so 
that CICO is less frequent).
The good news is that mobile phone penetration in Latin America 
and the Caribbean is high by international standards: unique sub-
scriber penetration in the region was 52 percent in 2014—the highest 
among developing regions (Almazán and Frydrych, 2015). However, 
Latin America still lags behind other developing regions in terms of 
using mobile technologies for financial services. With a few excep-
tions, such as Mexico, in most countries in the region, the ownership 
of mobile accounts is less than what would be expected given the 
penetration of mobile phone subscriptions, the physical coverage of 
the financial system, and the fraction of people residing in remote 
areas. More importantly, in most countries, the use of such accounts 
to receive money (the most prevalent use of mobile accounts every-
where) is less than what would be expected given the penetration of 
mobile accounts (see Figure 11.7).
As shown in Figure 11.7, more people in Mexico have a mobile 
account and use it than would be expected given the penetration of 
mobile telephony and the current physical coverage of the banking sys-
tem. An important contributing factor is that in 2012 Mexico became the 
first country in the world to ease the anti-money laundering regulations 
for bank accounts linked to mobile phones, while still complying with 
the new recommendations of GAFI (Money Laundering Financial Action 
Group) on low-risk products (Alonso et al., 2013).
Colombia is a noteworthy case because it still has low penetration of 
mobile accounts, but it ranks among the highest in the region in terms 
of regulation of digital financial services according to the 2015 Global 
Microscope.
In Peru, the regulator introduced a simplified process for opening 
financial products in 2011. In 2012, an electronic money law was passed 
that creates a new license for specialized operators, allowing nonfinan-
cial service providers to enter, and thus increasing competition. As a 
result, in a rather unprecedented coordination effort, the Peruvian bank-
ers’ association, ASBANC, is building a single platform that can be used 
by all parties involved in providing these services, including telecommu-
nication companies.
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In Paraguay, a novel feature of the regulation is that balances on 
mobile accounts that have been inactive for 90 days or more must be 
automatically transferred to a savings account at a formal financial 
institution.
Further policy interventions should support the development of the 
market for mobile banking specifically and the digital finance environment 










































b. Received domestic remittances through a mobile phone












Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Bank (2014b) and World Develompent Indicators 
database (World Bank). 
Note: The left panel plots the observed values for the fraction of adults with a mobile account 
(penetration) against those predicted by a linear regression using mobile phone penetration, bank 
branch and ATM per km2 and urbanization rate. The predictions in the right panel are for the use of 
mobile accounts (receiving domestic transfers) with mobile account penetration as sole regressor. 
Countries in sample: Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Botswanaa, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Chad, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ga-
bon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenyaa, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Republic of the 
Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzaniaa, Thailand, Togo, Ugandaa, Uruguay, venezuela, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.a 
a These countries are in the sample but are not shown; their predicted or observed values are 
greater than 20 percent.
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more generally. Such policies should build upon past achievements and 
current market conditions. Thus, they may differ from one country to 
another. Andrade and Mas (2015) describe at least five different sce-
narios under which the market for digital finance should flourish. The 
different policy avenues should be contingent on issues such as whether 
a big player is already taking most of the market and asymmetric reg-
ulation is required (as in Kenya) or whether a public agency is already 
working on reducing the use of cash among savers.
Specific policies can add dynamism to the digital finance market 
in the short term. For instance, they can address the need for special-
ized providers to enter the market (de Olloqui, Andrade, and Herrera, 
2015). This, in turn, requires developing appropriate regulation for the 
use of existing mobile infrastructure by entrants. Likewise, promoting 
interoperability among platforms (so that users can make transfers to 
and from accounts at different mobile finance providers and between 
platforms and traditional bank providers) is a key element in the effort 
to increase the scale of operations and lower service costs. More flexible 
and complex financial services through mobile phones will also require 
enhancing mobile network capabilities.
Financial Saving beyond Banking
Latin America has a bank-centered financial system and banks and capi-
tal markets are complements rather than substitutes in financial markets 
(see Chapter 3). Therefore, policies that encourage the growth of bank-
centered financial systems may also support the development of capital 
markets in the region, even though the exact way and pace at which 
each grows will vary according to the idiosyncrasies of each country.
However, specific aspects related to capital markets can help break 
the vicious circle of low saving and inefficient use of existing savings 
(shown in Figure 11.1).
One of these is pension funds, which are becoming increasingly 
important asset managers in many countries across the region (Beb-
czuk, 2015b). Assets managed by private pension systems exceed 50 
percent of GDP in Chile (an early reformer). They are also already high 
in Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, and are projected to continue growing. 
While these sums are still low compared to Advanced Economies, they 
are nonetheless sizable. This pool of capital is potentially important 
for funding productive investments like infrastructure because pension 
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funds accumulate long-term savings in domestic currency. However, 
the funds accumulated in pension funds are not always invested effi-
ciently. For example, the risk profile of infrastructure investment 
projects is attractive for investors with long-term horizons, such as 
pension funds (see Chapter 4). However, on average, only about 2 per-
cent of the total portfolio of pension funds in Latin America and the 
Caribbean is invested directly in infrastructure projects. This compares 
to between 5 and 7 percent of such investment portfolios in Austra-
lia and Canada. Conversely, a relatively high share of pension fund 
portfolios is invested in government bonds in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In some countries, the problem is compounded by the fact 
that the lack of alternative financing options increases governments’ 
temptation to capture the resources of institutional investors in order 
to cover their own current financing needs.9 To reverse this pattern, 
two changes are needed. First, the supply of “investible assets” must 
expand through regulatory and institutional reforms that turn infra-
structure into an asset class (see Chapter 4). Second, countries in the 
region should review pension fund investment allocation rules and reg-
ulations to enable and promote more investment diversification (see 
Chapter 7).
In addition, underdeveloped insurance markets in the region limit 
the opportunities for portfolio managers of pension funds and other 
asset managers to improve the risk-return profile of investment proj-
ects. A case in point is the collapse of Monoline insurance, which 
provided insurance to infrastructure bonds. This has severely limited 
the opportunities for prospective investors to mitigate risk. Deepening 
and strengthening insurance markets through regulatory and institu-
tional reforms is yet another way to promote the development of capital 
markets in the region.
Creating a virtuous Circle
Saving is low in Latin America and the Caribbean, and only a small frac-
tion of the savings generated is channeled to the rest of the economy via 
an efficient financial system. Financial systems across the region are small 
and inefficient. Encouraging efficient financial saving requires concerted 
efforts on the demand and supply sides of financial services.
To expand the customer base of financial services, financial inclu-
sion policies should be upgraded from the traditional focus on opening 
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bank accounts toward an approach that encourages the use of the for-
mal financial system as the main saving vehicle. Encouraging more 
formal financial saving, however, does not guarantee the efficient use 
of those savings. The resources must be channeled to enterprises with 
higher productive potential. Financial inclusion policies must be coupled 
with reforms that reduce distortions in financial markets to ensure that 
resources flow to the most productive—or potentially productive—uses.
Latin America and the Caribbean is caught in a vicious circle—but 
there is an alternative. The option is a virtuous circle (Figure 11.2) that 
begins with a culture of saving that generates higher savings for both 
firms and individuals to invest. The larger supply of loanable funds feeds 
the growth of the financial system, which can then lower its costs for 
lenders and borrowers alike. Lower costs are accompanied by regulatory 
reforms that strengthen property rights and expand credit informa-
tion. Capital is allocated more efficiently to productive firms that grow, 
employ more workers in the formal economy, and feed overall economic 
growth. Gainfully employed people in formal jobs earn enough to invest 
in their own and their children’s health and education and prepare for 
their retirement. A healthier, more educated workforce and a financial 
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system capable of supporting the investment needs of an expanding 
productive base fuel productivity. Higher productivity provides greater 
returns to investment and saving and, thus, encourages even more and 
better saving.
Despite the financial deregulation and reforms of recent decades, 
financial systems in Latin America and the Caribbean remain very 
shallow by international standards. Undeniably, the region has made 
notable progress in recent years. However, the region is still far from 
breaking into the virtuous circle. Fixing the system is not an easy task, 
but it is an important one. If Latin America and the Caribbean hopes 
to grow and prosper in a sustainable and equitable manner, its gov-




1 The aggregate marginal product of capital in the region is below that 
of Advanced Economies and Emerging Asia, according to calculations 
using a methodology that corrects marginal products for the effect of 
the relative price of capital (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007). For the median 
country in Latin America, the estimated marginal product of capital 
is 8.4 percent, while it is 11.1 percent in Advanced Economies and 9.3 
percent in Emerging Asia.
2 In addition to having to deal with financial market frictions and com-
petition issues, firms in the region may be inherently more volatile and 
risky, which could justify the persistence of high interest rate spreads. 
While this issue has not been properly researched, the relatively high 
profitability of the financial industry in Latin America and the Carib-
bean does not appear consistent with this hypothesis.
3 Coverage is measured as the percent of adults covered by the credit 
bureau. Research by Martínez Pería and Singh (2014) suggests that 
after the introduction of a credit bureau—but not a credit registry— 
firms can access loans from banks more easily, at lower cost, and at 
longer maturities. As predicted by theory, the effects are more pro-
nounced for smaller firms, which tend to be less transparent and less 
experienced.
4 A comprehensive review of the consequences of weak property rights 
in financial intermediation can be found in Fernández and Tamayo 
(forthcoming).
5 Economies of scale can also be achieved by coordinating suppliers. 
A clear example of the cost structure under which financial institu-
tions operate is their use of network-specific technologies. Physical 
branches, automated teller machines (ATMs), and mobile phone appli-
cations are often developed to function for a single institution or a 
small set of providers. Expanding the network to other suppliers (to 
increase the volume of users) would reduce unit costs; however, that 
would require coordination so that all providers/users would contrib-
ute their fair share to setting up and maintaining the system. The lack 
of coordination is a market failure that may warrant policy intervention.
6 Among many other things, the Global Microscope asks local experts to 
grade the ease with which saving products may be offered based on 
existing practices and regulations such as interest rate restrictions and 
account opening requirements. See : www.eiu.com/microscope2015
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7 In Latin America and the Caribbean, personal remittances received 
amount to about 6 percent of GDP, on average. For some countries, 
remittances (as a percent of GDP) are significantly higher (World 
Development Indicators Database)
8 A comprehensive review of some of the issues covered in this section 
can be found in Chong (2011).
9 Becerra, Cavallo, and Scartascini (2012) show that, in countries where 
governments have lower state capabilities, governments are more 
likely to direct credit to finance their own operations, thereby curtail-
ing credit to the private sector.
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